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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Elawnee M. Pahvitse appeals from the district court's judgment and order summarily
dismissing her pro se petition for post-conviction relief. She argues that the district court erred by
denying her request for appointment of counsel. She contends that the district court should have
ruled on her request for counsel before it dismissed her petition, and she maintains that she raised
possibly valid claims to justify the appointment of counsel. Due to the district court's error,
Ms. Pahvitse respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment and order
and remand her case for the appointment of counsel.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 2, 2015, the district court entered a judgment of conviction that sentenced
Ms. Pahvitse to five years, with two years fixed, for driving under the influence, a felony.
(R., p.81.) The district court suspended execution of the sentence and placed Ms. Pahvitse on
probation for four years. (R., p.81.) Eventually, on November 1, 2017, the district court revoked
Ms. Pahvitse's probation and executed imposition of her sentence. (R., p.82.) Although the
district court stated that she did not file an appeal, Ms. Pahvitse did in fact appeal from the
district court's order revoking her probation. In Supreme Court Docket No. 45568, the Idaho
Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the district court's order revoking probation on
June 5, 2018. Unpublished Opinion,1 State v. Pahvitse, No. 45568 (Ct. App. June 5, 2018). The
Court issued a remittitur on June 15, 2018. Remittitur, State v. Pahvitse, No. 45568-2017
(June 15, 2018).

1

Contemporaneously with this briefs filing, Ms. Pahvitse moved for this Court to take judicial
notice of the Court of Appeals' opinion and remittitur in her underlying criminal case.
1

On August 16, 2018, Ms. Pahvitse filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., pp.5-9.) She indicated that she had previously appealed "from the judgment of conviction or
the imposition of sentence," and she cited the docket number "45568-2017." (R., p.6.)
Ms. Pahvitse alleged three ineffective assistance of counsel claims: ( 1) not looking into an
"Action Plan State" in the probation violation report and not including it in her file; (2) not
offering any other options due to her probation violation and "not looking into detail of case,"
such as a "secondary court, sanction, or discretionary time"; and (3) "[ d]id not receive paperwork
or served warrants while incarcerated." (R., pp.6-7.) She also alleged a claim for "probation
officer not present during sentencing." (R., p.6.) For relief, she requested "[a]nother chance at
probation, upon immediate release." (R., p.8.) In an affidavit in support, she wrote:
During my appearance in court Ms. Guiberson was not present.
Ms. Haines did not come to the jail to talk to me about, but the I only received
was copies of warrants. I was not aware of this Action Plan until I filed an appeal
and received a copy of my case. The Action Plan that was not given to me neither
did I sign. I don't find my sentence appropriate in this matter. I also was not
offered secondary court or a sanction throughout my case. While incarcerated in
April 201 7 I was not served warrants nor was I at a court hearing involving a no
bond bench warrant. Got sentenced 30 day served 16 in Bonneville County. Was
told by public defender after sentencing I did not qualify for DUI Court pending
PV, there was not pending PV.
(R., p.10 (sic).) Ms. Pahvitse also moved for the appointment of counsel. (R., pp.21-23.)
On September 20, 2018, the State answered and moved for summary dismissal.
(R., pp.25-26, 75-76.) In its motion, the State argued that Ms. Pahvitse's petition "fails to raise a
genuine issue of material fact and is time barred." (R., p.75.) The State also asserted that her
claims were "bare and conclusory, unsubstantiated by fact, procedurally defaulted, or clearly
disproved by the record." (R., p.75.) In its brief in support of summary dismissal, the State noted
that Ms. Pahvitse appealed from the district court's order revoking probation, but not the initial
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.29-30.) In its brief, the State argued: (1) Ms. Pahvitse's claims

2

were time-barred because she did not file her petition within one year of the time to file an
appeal from the initial judgment of conviction; (2) her claims should have been raised on direct
appeal; (3) any claims related to probation revocation were also time-barred because she did not
appeal from the district court's order revoking probation;2 and (4) "Petitioner's claim that other
options to prison were not offered is disproven by the record as evidenced by the multiple
chances given to complete probation without success." (R., pp.35-36.) The State also objected to
Ms. Pahvitse's request for counsel. (R., pp.77-78.) The State argued that her claims were
time-barred because she did not file her petition within one year of the time to file an appeal
from the judgment of conviction. (R., p. 78.)
About six months later, on March 25, 2019, the district court issued an order denying
post-conviction relief. (R., pp.80-102.) In the procedural history section, the district court stated
that Ms. Pahvitse did not appeal from the district court's order revoking probation. (R., p.82.)
Next, district court ruled that Ms. Pahvitse was not entitled to the appointment of counsel.
(R., p.86.) The district court further reasoned that her petition was untimely and her ineffective

assistance of counsel claims failed on the merits. (R., pp.96-102.) On her ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, the district court determined that Ms. Pahvitse's petition "did not raise
verifiable facts sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing" and her allegations were "bare and
conclusory." (R., p.98; see also R., pp.99-100.) Beyond the lack of evidence, the district court
determined that her petition did not meet its burden to show the two-part standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel. (R., pp.101-02.) On the same day, the district court entered a

2

Again, Ms. Pahvitse did appeal from the district court's revocation order, as acknowledged by
the State earlier in its brief in support of summary dismissal. (See R., p.30.)
3

judgment dismissing Ms. Pahvitse's petition with prejudice. (R., p.104.) Ms. Pahvitse timely
appealed. (R., pp.106-09.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err by dismissing Ms. Pahvitse's pro se petition for post-conviction relief
before providing notice of its denial of her request for counsel?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Dismissing Ms. Pahvitse's Pro Se Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief Before Providing Notice Of Its Denial Of Her Request For Counsel

A.

Introduction
Ms. Pahvitse submits three related arguments with respect to the district court's denial of

her request for counsel. First, she argues that the district court erred by denying both her request
for counsel and her petition for post-conviction relief at the same time. Second, she argues that
this error is not harmless because she alleged facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim. Third,
she argues that the district court erred by ruling her petition was untimely.

B.

Standard Of Review And Post-Conviction Jurisprudence
A petition for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361

(2013).
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief must
prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application
for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24 (2000). Unlike
the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application for postconviction relief must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the
claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an
application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within
the personal knowledge of the applicant. LC. § 19-4903. The application must
include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must
state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.

Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
The district court can summarily dismiss or grant a petition for post-conviction relief if
"there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter o flaw." I. C. § 19-4 906(b), (c). "In considering summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief, the trial court must accept as true verified allegations of fact in the

6

application or in supporting affidavits, no matter how incredible they may appear, unless they
have been disproved by other evidence in the record." Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 909
(Ct. App. 1995). The district court is "required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as
true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Any
disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and "all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148
Idaho 44, 45 (2009). A petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel will "survive a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes:
(1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a
material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case." Pratt v.

State, 134 Idaho 581, 583 (2000). If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272
(Ct. App. 2002).
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.

Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Because the evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does
not involve the finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only
determinations of law. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews a district court's summary
dismissal order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006).
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
"[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970)). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must generally
show that (1) his attorney's performance did not meet "an objective standard ofreasonableness,"
and (2) his attorney's deficient performance prejudiced him. Id. at 687-88. "When a claimant
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to file a motion, a "critical
inquiry is whether the motion, if filed, should have been granted.... " Wurdemann v. State, 161
Idaho 713, 717 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 385). If the Court
determines "the motion, had it been filed, should have been granted, the petitioner is still
required to overcome the presumption that the decision not to file the motion 'was within the
wide range of permissible discretion and trial strategy."' Id. at 718 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006)).
Lastly, the Court uses a four-part test for discretionary decisions. Lunneborg v. My Fun
Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). The Court considers "[w]hether the trial court: (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion;
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Id.

C.

The District Court Should Have Ruled On, And Granted, Ms. Pahvitse's Request For
Counsel Before Dismissing Her Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
Ms. Pahvitse maintains that the district court erred by denying her request for counsel

because the district court did not rule the motion before it decided the merits of her petition for
post-conviction relief. She also argues that this error necessitates reversal because her petition
alleged facts raising the possibility of a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the
probation revocation proceedings. Lastly, she argues that the district court erred by ruling her
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petition was untimely because she filed her petition within the time limitations to raise claims
challenging the probation revocation proceedings.

1.

The district court abused its discretion by denying Ms. Pahvitse 's request for
counsel and dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief at the same time

It is well established that the district court may appoint counsel at public expense for a

petitioner unable to pay for legal representation. LC. § 19-4904. The district court's decision to
appoint counsel is discretionary. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004). The district
court must appoint counsel "if the petition qualifies financially and 'alleges facts to raise the
possibility of a valid claim."' Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793). Conversely, if the claims are frivolous, the district court may

deny a request for counsel. Id. "If the court decides that the claims in the petition are frivolous, it
should provide sufficient notice regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to
provide additional facts, if they exist, to demonstrate the existence of a non-frivolous claim." Id.
(citing Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 653-54 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793).
Because the standard for the appointment of counsel is much lower than the standard to
avoid summary dismissal, the district court must address the petitioner's request for counsel
"before ruling on the substantive issues in the case and errs if it denies a petition on the merits
before ruling on the applicant's request for counsel." Id. For example, in Charboneau, the Court
held that the district court erred by summarily dismissing the defendant's petition for
post-conviction relief before ruling on his motion for counsel. 140 Idaho at 792-94. There, the
defendant filed a successive pro se petition for post-conviction relief and a motion for counsel.
Id. at 791. The State moved for summary dismissal. Id. The district court granted the State's

motion and dismissed the petition, but the district court never ruled on the defendant's motion for
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counsel. Id. The Court reasoned that the district court must first rule on a motion for counsel so
the defendant has the opportunity to amend his petition or file additional evidence in response:
It is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of the claimed defects so
he has an opportunity to respond and to give the trial court an adequate basis for
deciding the need for counsel based upon the merits of the claims. If the court
decides that the claims in the petition are frivolous, the court should provide
sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to
supplement the request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist. Although
the petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the
record for possible nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a meaningful
opportunity to supplement the record and to renew his request for court-appointed
counsel prior to the dismissal of his petition where, as here, he has alleged facts
supporting some elements of a valid claim.

Id. at 793 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001)). Because the district court did
"not specifically address[ ] the appointment of counsel issue before dealing with the substantive
issues of Charboneau's Petition, the district court abused its discretion." Id. at 793. Accordingly,
the Court vacated the district court's order of summary dismissal and remanded the case for the
district court to determine whether to appoint counsel to assist the defendant. Id. at 794. Along
the same lines, in Judd, the Court of Appeals held that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief at the same time as its denial of a request for
counsel. 148 Idaho at 24-25. In Judd, the defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief and a motion for counsel. Id. at 23. The district court notified the defendant of its intent to
dismiss the petition as untimely. 3 Id. The defendant responded, but did not address the timeliness
issue. Id. The defendant also filed another motion for counsel. Id. The district court denied the
defendant's petition and, in the same order, denied the motion for counsel. Id. at 23-24. On

3

Prior to the district court's notice, the district court had dismissed the defendant's petition
without notice of its intent to dismiss. Judd, 148 Idaho at 23. The defendant appealed, and the
Court remanded the case for the district court to give proper notice. Id.
10

appeal, the Court of Appeals held that "the district court committed error by failing to rule on his
request for counsel before dismissing his petition." Id. at 24-25.
As in Charboneau and Judd, the district court here did not apply the correct legal
standards and thus abused its discretion by failing to rule on Ms. Pahvitse's request for counsel
before dismissing her petition. It was "essential" for Ms. Pahvitse to have notice of the defects in
her petition so she could "supplement the request [for counsel] with the necessary additional
facts, if they exist." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679).
Ms. Pahvitse should have been "provided with a meaningful opportunity to supplement the
record" and "renew" her request for counsel before the dismissal of her petition. Id. (quoting
Brown, 135 Idaho at 679). By ruling on her motion for counsel and dismissing her petition in the

same order, the district court did not apply the correct legal standards. Therefore, Ms. Pahvitse
asserts that the district court's denial of her motion for counsel was an abuse of discretion.

2.

The district court's error in denying Ms. Pahvitse 's request for counsel requires
reversal because she alleged facts raising the possibility of a valid claim

Even though Ms. Pahvitse has shown error in the district court's denial of her request for
counsel, the Idaho appellate courts will uphold "an order that simultaneously dismisses a postconviction action and denies a motion for appointed counsel" if two conditions are satisfied.
Judd, 148 Idaho at 25. The petitioner must have "received notice of the fatal deficiencies of the

petition and if, when the standard governing a motion for appointment of counsel is correctly
applied, the request for counsel would properly be denied-that is, when the petitioner did not
allege facts raising even the possibility of a valid claim." Id. (citing Workman v. State, 144 Idaho
518, 529 (2007); Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-55; Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 760-63 (Ct. App.
2006); Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493-94 (Ct. App. 2004)). Although Ms. Pahvitse does
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not assert a lack of notice (because the State moved for summary dismissal), she nonetheless
argues that the district court applied the incorrect standard to determine whether appointment of
counsel was warranted. She further argues that, using the correct standard, the district court
should have granted her request for counsel.
First, the district court did not apply the correct standard when denying Ms. Pahvitse’s
request for counsel in its order dismissing her petition. While the district court cited the
“possibility of a valid claim” standard, (R., pp.84–86), the district court did not apply this
standard. Instead, the district court referenced its analysis on the merits of Ms. Pahvitse’s claims
for summary dismissal purposes as the basis for its denial of her motion for counsel. (R., p.86
(“Based on the analysis to follow, the allegations do no justify the appointed of counsel.”).) That
analysis applied the much more stringent standards to survive summary dismissal. (R., pp.87–
94.) The district court considered whether Ms. Pahvitse’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel were timely, whether she presented admissible evidence, and whether she showed
deficient performance and prejudice. (R., pp.94–102.) None of the district court’s discussion
used the “possibility of a valid claim” standard. (See R., pp.87–102.) This was in error. “[T]he
standard that a post-conviction petition must meet in order to call for appointment of counsel is
considerably lower than the standard to avoid summary dismissal.” Plant, 143 Idaho at 761. The
district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards by using the harsher
standard on summary dismissal to determine whether Ms. Pahvitse should be appointed counsel.
Therefore, the district court abused its discretion “by failing to apply the correct standard
governing the request for appointed counsel.” Judd, 148 Idaho at 25.
Second, if the correct standard is applied, Ms. Pahvitse established the possibility of a
valid claim to warrant the appointment of counsel. When determining whether the petitioner
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raised the possibility of a valid claim, "every inference must run in the petitioner's favor where
the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be expected to know how to properly
allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 794.
[T]he trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se
petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to
state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist, they also may not be
alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the essential
elements of a claim.
Id. at 792 (quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679). Here, Ms. Pahvitse's allegations in her petition and

affidavit were sparse, but she raised the possibility of valid claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel during the probation revocation proceedings. Construing all inferences in her favor,
Ms. Pahvitse alleged that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an action plan,
failing to call her probation officer to be present or testify, and failing to argue for other options
(such as a secondary court or additional jail time) at the probation revocation hearing. (R., pp.6,
7, 10.) Ineffective assistance of counsel during probation revocation proceedings is a cognizable
claim for post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 442--44 (Ct. App.
2007) (failing to challenge alleged probation violations and failing to investigate and present
evidence at revocation hearing); Munster v. State, 129 Idaho 65, 68 (Ct. App. 1996) (failure to
object to condition of probation); Fox v. State, 125 Idaho 672, 675 (Ct. App. 1994) (failure to
prepare adequately for probation violation hearing); Lake v. State, 126 Idaho 333, 335-36
(Ct. App. 1994) (failure to investigate and research probation violations). In light of
Ms. Pahvitse's pro se status at the time of her filings, her petition and affidavit raised the
possibility of valid claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the probation revocation
proceedings. The district court should have granted her motion for counsel to investigate and
develop these claims.
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3. The district court erred by ruling Ms. Pahvitse 's petition was untimely

Finally, Ms. Pahvitse maintains that the district court, and the State, incorrectly
determined that Ms. Pahvitse' s petition was not filed within the time limitations set forth in
I.C. § 19-4902. (See R., pp.35-36, 94-98.) This statute provides:
A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with
the clerk of the district court in which the conviction took place. An application
may be filed at any time within one ( 1) year from the expiration of the time for
appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a
proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.
I.C. § 19-4902(a). Here, Ms. Pahvitse filed her petition within one year from the determination of
her appeal of the district court's order revoking probation. On June 5, 2018, the Idaho Court of
Appeals issued an opinion affirming the district court's order revoking Ms. Pahvitse's probation.
Unpublished Opinion, State v. Pahvitse, No. 45568. On June 15, 2018, the Court issued the
remittitur. Remittitur, State v. Pahvitse, No. 45568-2017. Ms. Pahvitse filed her pro se petition
on August 16, 2018, sixty-two days after the remittitur. (R., pp.5-9.) As such, Ms. Pahvitse's
petition was filed within the year deadline from the determination of the appeal. Any ineffective
assistance of counsel claims that pertained to the district court's revocation of Ms. Pahvitse's
probation, such as the failure to present action plan and to argue other options, were timely. 4 See,
e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 139 Idaho 384, 385-86 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the defendant's

post-conviction petition, filed within one year of her appeal from the district court's order
revoking her probation, was timely "only to challenge the probation revocation proceedings," but
not the judgment of conviction or sentence). Therefore, the district court erred by ruling
Ms. Pahvitse's petition was barred by the statute of limitations in I.C. § 19-4902.

4

To the extent that any of Ms. Pahvitse's ineffective assistance of counsel claims relate to her
original sentencing (e.g., "I don't find my sentence appropriate in this matter," (R., p.10)),
Ms. Pahvitse does not pursue those claims on appeal because they are untimely.
14

CONCLUSION
Ms. Pahvitse respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment and
its order denying post-conviction relief and remand this case to the district court for an order to
appoint counsel.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2019.

Isl Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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